When treating negation in logic programming, many problems must be faced and attempts to solve them may be sorted out more or less according to their faithfulness to negation as failure, which is the negation really used in Prolog [4, 10, 14, 22, 231. It does not seem possible to stay close to Prolog while having an easy axiomatical semantics: we are not sure to find a sound and complete semantics for negation as faiiure. A negation other than negation as failure is also used in expert systems working in forwards chaining.
When treating negation in logic programming, many problems must be faced and attempts to solve them may be sorted out more or less according to their faithfulness to negation as failure, which is the negation really used in Prolog [4, 10, 14, 22, 231. It does not seem possible to stay close to Prolog while having an easy axiomatical semantics: we are not sure to find a sound and complete semantics for negation as faiiure. A negation other than negation as failure is also used in expert systems working in forwards chaining.
The theory we propose here is quite general and can be applied to both Logic Programming and this negation. It has good theoretical and algebraic properties similar to those obtained in logic programming with negation. The parallel lies in the introduction of a third truth value, indefinite and a new non-monotonic implication connective denoted by +. We thus obtain a very simple way of treating negation
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%ting [7, X, r)] uses tltree-valued logic for logic programming, which actually means not giving a truth value to any ground atom. In his paper [7] , Fitting introduces a third truth vnlue I (Indehnite).
He . . , x.) where p is a predicate symbol of P without being in any head of its rules. Fitting is interested in the semantical interpretation of a program as fixpoints of operators. His order on the set of three-valued Herbrand interpretations is the set inclusion which corresponds to the order I -S F, I s Ton { 7, F, I}. With each three-valued Herbrand interpretation i, is associated the mapping !vir Mined from the set o . the language formulas to the set {T, F, I}, its image on a formula being the truth value of the formula with respect to i. His operator FPr is defined by its image on a three-valued Herbrand interpretation by This operator is monotonic and the tixpoints of FPr are exactly the models of the completicjn of Pr. As a union Gf partial models is not necessarily a three-valued interpretation, the set of the three-valued interpretations is no longer a complete lattice but only a semi-complete one: the ininrsection of two three-valued Herbrand interpretations is still a three-valued Herbrand interpretation and a consistent union of two three-valued Herbrand interpretations is a three-valued Herbrand interpretation. The mapping Fisv has a least fixpoint which is also the least model of comp( P) and does not have any greatest fixpoint but only several maximal ones. There are thm twG ways of defining the semnnfics of a logic program:
o the least fixpoint of Fr,, e the optimal lixpoint of F,,, which is the greatest fixpoint less or equal to the intersection of all the maximal fixpoints and which is also the greatest consistent fixpoint. Our theory is close to Fitting's but we give a new interpretation of the connective + and define the notion of Herbrand model of Pr wit.hout using its completion: the specification of a program will thus be the program itself. We can express its connective -with our implication connective, the negation and the cp,njunctiGn symbol; we can obtain FPr from our mapping TPr by completing our program.
Lassez [13] also uses a three-valued logic. The programs considered have only Horn clauses: At A,, . . , A,,. His implication connective is Lukasiewicz's one, and has the following truth table:
A + l3 is not True ii' A gets the truth value 'F and B gets the truth value I (A+B gets the truth value I), if A gets the truth value T and B gets the truth value F (A+ B gets the truth value F), If A gets the truth value I and B gets the truth value F (A+ B gets the truth value I). A + B gets the truth value T otherwise.
The formula P + Q is not 'logically equivalent to the formula -9 v Q, if P and Q have the truth value 1 for instance. His order on [T, F. I) corresponds to the set inclusion order on the set of the three-valued Herbrand interpretations (I s F, I s T). The operator 7 associated with a logic program P is defined in the following way (a Herbrand interpretation being considered as an application from the set of ground formulas to {T, F, I}):
e if there is a ground instance of a rule of P with A in its head, At B,, . . . , B,,, such that f( B, ,+ . . A B,,) = T, then 7(f)(A) = T,
The fixpoints of r are exactly the models of P For this operator, the two notions of optimal fixpoint and least lixpoint are the same. This especially comes from the fact that the interpretation constantly equal to True, is always a model of a program with Horn clauses. It follows that neither the least model nor the optimal model of a program (which are both included in the maximal interpretation constantly equal to True), take the truth value False. The negative information, which resuits from the completed program, IS not really represented in this semantics model. So this semantics does not seem well-suited to logic programming with negation, ldycroft [18] also uses three-valued logic. However, the clauses considered are definite program clauses, in order to show that a many valued logic is better suited to the SLD-resolution.
He introduces the same operator as Apt and Van Emden [28] . The truth tables of the connectives h, and v are the same as the ones we use. He does not introduce any 'mplication connective. The three-valued part of his paper is essentially contained in Fitting's paper.
Kunen [ll] uses three-valued logic only for programs with positive rules. His work is very close to Fitting's because he considers the completion of a program and has the same operator. According to him, the semantics of a logic P program, is not the least fixpoint of the operator T but TTo, which is not always a model of I? From our point of view, a good semantics should be expressed in terms of axioms and models.
Finally, Przymusinski [19, 201, has a new vision on three-valued logic. In [19] , he introduces three truth values and an order on {T, F, I}, Fs Is T which does not correspond to the set inclusion order on the set of the Herbrand three-valued interpretations.
A Herbrand interpretation 3 is given by two sets of ground atoms: F and 9, without saying that Sn 9 = 0, which allows a ground atom to have two truth values. In this context, negation is no longer monotonic while in our theory, the monotonicity of negation enables us to extend the monotony property, which has many consequences. His implication connective, although it never gets the truth value Indefinite (I), is not the same as ours. It is defined by tv,(A+B)= T iff tv,(B)atv,(A), tv,(A+ B) = F otherwise.
Our implication connective gets the truth value True more often than this one and it follows that we will have more models in our theory. The logic programs he considered are definite ones with only positive rules (A e L,, . . , IL,, A is an atom and L, are literalsj. The operator associated with each program is built on two levels; this operator is monotonic and its least tixpoint is the least model of P. Our operator is built in a much more simple way, as an extension of Apt and Van Emden's. However, the models obtained with his implication connective are models for us too.
Manna and Shamir [16, 17) , have developed a theory of optimal fixpoints for any monotonic functional defined on a set of partial functions. This theory may interest us because the three-valued Herbrand interpretations we consider. may be considered as partial functions from the set of the ground atoms to the set {T, F} (not being defined where they get the truth value Indefinite). We adapt what could have been done for partial functions to three-valued logic. However, we do not develop this notion in this paper (see [24] ). Another development of three-valued logic for logic programming seems possible [5, 241. We try to present some aspects of il irr this paper.
An extension of the bivalued logic for programs with negation
We first recall the properties obtained for logic programs without negation. L is a logical language with the connectives A, v, d, ti, 1, and the quantifiers V, 3. The set Her(L) denotes the set of ail the ground literals (atoms or negations of an atom) not containing the equality predicate, her(L) being the set of the positive ground literals and lher(L) the negative ones, the set UNI(L) is the set of all the ground terms. These notaticns are available for every language L, even when the language is extended.
When studying ptograms without negation with rules like ato+ for where the formula for uses the symbols V, 3, A, v, we use the notion of bivalued Herbrand interpretations.
The set 2'lercL1 of all the bivalued Herbrand interpretations, which is the set of all the subsets of her(L), is ordered by the set inclusion. This order corre:.ponds to the order induced by FS T on the set of the functions from For( 2,) to {T, F}, with the correspondence $ : 2""I'-' -,{Functions from For(L) to {T, F}}, such that J/(i) = tv, (where tv,(for) denotes the truth value of a formula for of For(L), defined for an atom ato by tv,(ato) =True if atoE i. False otherwise, and extended as usual for any formula for).
The first important property we wil! have to extend is a mono!ony prcputy. If ' rs monotonic for the set inclusion order on 2he"L1 and the order induced by F-S T on the functions from F(L) to {T, F}. It means that if the formula for makes the body of a rule of a program without negation, i.e. is a formula using the symbols V, 3, n, v, then i z j implies that tv,(for) s tv,(for). 
If we want to study programs having rules with negation, like lit t for where lit is a literal and the formula for uses the symbols V, 3, n, v, 7, =+, G, we would like to extend the monotony property to the formulas making the body of a rule of such programs. This is why we introduce a third truth value Indefinite and we associate the notion of three-valued interpretation with this truth value. To make the parallel easier with the bivalued case, we will define a bivalued Herbrand interpretation as a peculiar case of a three-valued one.
Definition 1.1. A three-valued interpretation is a consistent subset i ofthe set Her(E), that is:
ato E i implies that late G i.
The set of all rhe three-valued Herbrand interpretations is denoted by IHT(L). A bivalued Herbrand interpretation
is a three-valued complete one, that is:
The set of all the bivalued Herbrand interpretations is denoted by IHB(L).
To come back to the usual definition, we use the mapping pos: IHB( L) --) 2hrr'L', i + in her(L), which associates its positive part with a Herbrand bivalued interpretation. The corresponding order on IHB(L) is i~j iff pas(i) C_ pos(j).
Remark 12. We may consider a three-valued Herbrand interpret&m as a partial interpretation, assuming that if ato and Fate do not beiong to i, then ato daes not get a truth value belonging to {T, F} but tc,(ato) = 1. 
The truth value of -I is delined by -IT = F, IF = T, lI= I, and the truth value of PJQ is defined as usual by the truth value of 1P v Q, and the truth value of P@Q by the truth value of (~+Q)A(QJP).
(i) We then define the truth value tv, with respect to a three-valued i Herbrand interpretation of a closed formula .f using the connectives A, v, -I, 3, w, and the quantifers V, 3, inductively by the following: e If J-ato E ber( L), tvi(f) = T iff ato E i, F iff -iato E i, Indefinite otherwise.
?? If j'= ( I =" u), (where I and u are two gronnd terms of the language) tv,(f) = T iff t and u are syntactically identical, False otherwise.
?? If J= -,g, or (g y h) where y E {A, v, 3, e}, the truth value off is defined as usual with the truth tables above. * Iff=Vxg, tv,(J') = T iff for every t element of UNI(L), tv,(g(f)) = T, F iff there is a t element of UNI(L), tv,(g(t)) = F, Indefinite otherwise.
e The same if f= 3xg. Proof. We have to show that ifthe formula for uses the symbols A, v, -I,=+, O, V, 3, is j implies that tvi(for) :' tvj(for). By induction on for. U Remark 1.5. This monotony property means that if the formula for uses the symbols A, v, -I,+, @, V, 3, having the truth value of some of its atoms unknown (Indefinite), its truth value cannot change (from True to False or the converse) but only gets a well-known truth value (True or False).
We have extended the monotony property to For(L) by introducing a new truth value Indelinite. Since, even with this new truth value I, the formula f+g gets the same truth value as the formula ~J'v g in any Herbrand interpretation, and since we do not yet have the intersection models property with rules Iike lit+for, we are now going to extend the logical language L by adding a new implication connective to it. It is neither Lukasiewicz nor Xleene's one, but is denoted by +, in order to give another expressivity to the implication connective as we said in the introduction. (b) if we include in For(L), the formulas using the connective +, the mapping 4:IHT(L)+{Functions from For(L) to {T, F, I)}, such that c#( i) = tvj is no longer monotonic.
One of the reasons for the choice of + is the completeness of the logic obtained. We have proved [24] that there is a formal system such that: e if A is a formula of propositional calculus using the symbols -J, +, we have an equivalence between "A is a theorem of this forma1 system" and "A is a tautology"; o we have another completeness theorem in propositional calculus for any formula using the symbols 7, +, A, and in predicate calculus for any formula using the symbols 7, +, and the existential quantifier 3 as well.
The last completeness theorem enables us to ensure that the set of tautologies of this logic in predicate calculus is recursively enumerable. We have also proved that it is not recursive [24] .
At this step of the extension of the truth values and the language, we are now able to get the model intersection property for a Pr program having rules like lit+-for, if lit is a literal and the formula for uses the symbols n, v. 7, +, @, V. 3. We first
give the definitions of weak and strong three-vaiued tierbrand model of a program wi?h negation in the fo!lowi:rg definition. ~(9(X,,...,X,,)A?9(X,,.. .,X8,)). In the following, we will only use the notion of strong model, to be called model, since it is actually the same notion as the notion of weak model for the programs we study.
We then have the following intersection model property. This is why even if we allow negation in the head of the rules, programs with only positive rules, will play a peculiar part as in the theory of Fitting. To palliate the case of inconsistency of a Pr program, we add an element to the set IHT(L), which we call Contra in the following way. We are now able to define the "consequence" operator which is associated wi.h a Pr program with negation. Remark 1.14. We have also studied the notion of optimal model (optimal postfixpoint) which provides a denotationai semantics other than the least fixpoint. Since the set of three-value Herbrand interpretations is not a complete lattice, we do not have a biggest model but only several maximal ones. The intersection of all these models is called the optimal model, which coincides with the biggest consistent model. For more details, see [24] .
In the following proposition, we know exactly the 01 ordinal such that Tpcto = Ifp(T,,) in the case when Pr is a definite program having rules like litr..lit,, . . . , lit,,, where lit is a literal without the equality predicate and the liti ate literals. We thus have an increasing sequence of three-valued Herbrand interpretations.
Proposition 1.15. (a) u Pr is a f/wee-odued definife progmm, then TPr is conrinuous. T,,, is nor conhurous ,ji,r every
If Pr is a program without any quantifier, then it can be transformed into a definite p,rogram as we will see in the following, and since we will have Tpr= T+,, TPr will be continuous.
If Pr is a program without any Function symbol, then every increasing sequence of interpretations is stationary and there is no problem of continuity.
In the next section, we study the relations between our "consequence" operator, the Apt and Van Emden's one for programs without negation, and Fitting's operator for programs with only positive rules. To make this last link, we will need to introduce two -rotions of T-completion and +-completion.
The relations between our operator, Apt and Van Emden and Fitting's operators
We recall here the definition of the "consequence" operator of Apt and Van Emden in our formalism. 
Remark 2.2. We know that BP, is monotonic, for the order is j@pos( i) c gas(j).
It follows that B,,, has a least fixpoint which is also the !east bivalued Herbrand We are now going to study the relations between our operator and Fitting's one for programs having positive rules. In order to make these relations easier, we need the two notions of ?-completion and of +-completion of a program. To make these two completions, we introduce the normal form of a program. Finally to make the logical link between a program and its normal form, we need to introduce the notion of three-valued Herbrend tautology and equivalence. Before that we carry on with the extension of the logical language. We can see that the formula S+ g and the formula -~g + 71 do not have the same truth value in any Herbrand interpretation; for instance if i is an interpretation such that tvi(j') = I and tvi(g)= E This is why, instead of having only one connective equivalence associated with --) as in the bivalued case (ti), we have two equivatence connectives according to the following definition. (b) Two formulas f and g of a logical language containing c) are logically Herbrand equivalent iff f-g is a Herbrand three-valued tautology. We denote the fact that f and g are !ogically Herbrand equivalent by f =rn g. Remark 2.7. To say that i==7Hf++g is stronger than saying that f and g have the same truth vahte in any Herbrsnd interpretation.
l='rnf*g implies that f and g have the same truth value in any Herbrand interpretation but the converse is false except when f and g are closed formulas of the language.
We could have defined these notions more generally, for every three-valued interpretation, for the general case, see [24] . The followi:?g examp!es, which we need for making the logical link between a program and its normal form, are true in every three-valued interpretation. ~(1,.,,...,r,.,,) tfor,). Proof. Easy with Proposition 2.13. 0
We are now able to define the two kinds of Gon~pletion of a program. (r,, r,, I . . , ,,, r ). This is not a threevalued rule in general.
We do the same for the packs of negative rules by using the fact that ""I--iato =., ,, iuo. Example 2.17. We give an example of -t-completion which ailows us to define the predicate odd (by the negation of the predicate ewe..,; _I% . 11 -1 ht : s w allow the negation in the programs, we could have defined it without this mechanism. Let Pr be the program rl : even(ze) r,: even(fo(fo(x)))+-even(x).
The normal form of rl and rz is r: even(y) + 3x (y = ze v (y = fo(fo(x)) A even(x))). The l-completion of Pr is the program obtain by adding to r the rule 7even(y) +Vx (7(y =ze) i\ (7(y = fo(fo(x))) v 7even(x))).
We could have defined the T-even predicate without using the mechanism of completion by leven(fo(y)) t even(y.).
Remark 2.18. If
Pr is a bivalued program with the rules ato + for, with the formula for using the symbols V, 3, A, v, rhen we have oniy one completion because VComp(1, Pr) =aVComp(*, Pr), since we have TBJTA zB A3.3 f?'sg means that the formu!a feg is a bivalued tautology, which means True in every bivalued interpretation). We are now able to make the relation between our "consequence" operator and Fitting's operator. To mnke this relation, we first give the definition of the operator of Fitting in our formalism: For the liter& ~p(x,, . . . , x,) where p is a predicate symbol of Pr without being in any head of its rules, we cannot have both a ground instance of p(x,, . . . , x,,) and its negation in Tc~,,,,,~~,P~) (i) since p does not appear in the head of a rule of Pr. . , a,,) be the head of a ground instance of a rule of Pr; it comes from ato(t,.,f~,,. . . ,.v,J,. . , r,.,,h,. ..,h))+forh+,. ,.vJ.
Let(n,,.,.
, t~,~) E IJNI( f.)" be such that rg,,( u, , . , u,,) = a,, for every j = 1, , n. Pr)e T,-,,,,,.,,,,,,(i) c ieF,,(i)c i.
Result (2b) may be proved in two ways:
?? The first way using Fitting's argument saying that i is a model of Pr (which means a model of its completion) iff i is a Iixpoint of FPr and using that the Fitting's completion of a Pr program is the +-completion of the l-completion of a program in our way, we then obtain that a three-valued Herbrand interpretation i is a model of Comp(+, Comp(1, Pr))e&(i) = i.
?? The second way will be seen as a result of the following Proposition 2.21. In the next section, we study the operational semantics of a program: we show how to get a three-valued interpreter from a bivalued one.
Interpreters
The meaning of a program is given by its least model. We now search for algorithms that compute that smallest model or give informations on it. We thus define three kinds of interpreters:
?? the ground answer interpreters:
which answer if a ground atom (resp. literalj belongs to Ibm(Pr) (resp. ltm(Prj); 0 the open answer interpreters: which answer, for a given atom (resp. literal) with variables, ato(x,.
. ,.x,), (resp. lit(x,, . . , x,,)), a sequence of substitutions such that all the ground instances of &(ato(x,, . . ,x,,j) (resp. 8i(lit(x,,. . . , x"))) are exactly the ground instances of ato(x,, . .-,x0) (resp. lit(x,, . . . , x,)) which are in Ihm(Pr) (resp. hm(Pr)); the saturating interpreters:
which give a finite representation of Ibm(Pr) (resp. Itm(Pr)).
Remark 3.1. It is easy to transform a three-valued interpreter for a bivalued program into a bivalued interpreter for this program since Ibm(Pr) = pas-'(ltm(Pr)) (Proposition 2.3).
Remark 3.2. It is interesting to see how to get a three-valued interpreter from a bivalued one. We first transform a three-valued program into a bivalued one with the following transformations:
Let Pr be a threeSvalued program on a first order logical language L. u(L) is the first order logical language obtained from L by adding to it, not-t: for each predicate symbol P of L. Let o(Pr) be the bivalued program on o(L) obtained from Pr with the following transformations:
(1) We remove @ and + by using 
